Iran’s Crises Converge as Inflation, Shortages and Safety Failures Deepen

Emergency crews and heavy machinery cordon off a massive sinkhole after part of an urban roadway collapses in Iran

Written by
Mahmoud Hakamian

A run of official warnings and grim incidents in mid-December suggests Iran’s regime is confronting a multi-front crisis: currency instability, rising inflation expectations, emerging shortages, public-safety breakdowns and escalating factional conflict. Insiders and state-linked outlets repeatedly warn that economic distress could translate into unrest.

Iran’s Crises Converge as Inflation, Shortages and Safety Failures Deepen

Currency pressure and an inflation “tipping point”
On December 15, 2025, price-tracking sites reported the U.S. dollar reaching about 132,000 tomans—fresh evidence of continuing volatility.

The sharpest internal alarm came a day earlier from Hussein Abdeh-Tabrizi, an economist often cited in Iranian policy debates. On December 14, 2025, he said Iran could “most likely” see inflation close to 60% this year. If that pace repeats next year, he warned, confidence in the national currency could crack, accelerating “dollarization” as transactions shift toward dollars.

Abdeh-Tabrizi argued the danger is a sudden loss of control rather than a steady climb: inflation may not inch up from 60% to 70% or 80%; it could “suddenly become 2,000%—3,000%” once trust collapses and price controls unravel, forcing “free prices” on households.

Scarcity enters the political calculus
In a December 12, 2025, editorial in the state-run daily Sazandegi, insider Hossein Marashi argued the economy has been “hostage to the nuclear issue” for two decades and warned that food insecurity could be more destabilizing than external pressure. “What Netanyahu could not do with war and political pressure against the Islamic Republic,” he wrote, “a food crisis can.”

Marashi said inflation is already above 53% and could exceed 55% by year-end, while an official growth target of 8% has, he wrote, fallen to negative 2%. He also warned the state is struggling to secure around $30 billion in foreign currency for essential imports, including food and medicine.

Healthcare supply strains were flagged on December 14 by Babak Mesbahi, a member of a state-linked pharmacists’ association, who said drug reserves average “less than two months” and warned that roughly 800 medicines could face shortages within three months. The state-affiliated outlet Didban Iran reported another marker of household stress: specialists describing patients selling personal medicines to afford necessities.

Safety failures: roads and workplaces
Late on December 15, 2025, a passenger bus on an Isfahan route overturned and collided with a car, leaving at least 13 people dead. Injury totals varied across reporting, ranging from 11 to roughly 40. Police said the bus struck a guardrail, entered the opposite lane and hit a passenger vehicle.

The crash coincided with unusually blunt admissions from Hassan Momeni, deputy head of the regime’s traffic police, who said about 20,000 people die annually in road crashes and nearly 400,000 are injured, with 10–15% left with disabilities. He called the toll a “human catastrophe.”

Workplace safety issues also surfaced. On December 15, 2025, nine workers reportedly died from gas poisoning at a workshop unit in an industrial zone near Isfahan—an incident labor advocates blamed on weak oversight and underinvestment in basic protections.

Pollution, influenza and disrupted schools
On December 16, 2025, authorities announced school closures or remote learning in several provinces, including East Azerbaijan, Hormozgan, Bushehr and Semnan, citing air pollution and influenza. On Kish Island, education was moved online through December 18, 2025. A deputy at Shiraz University of Medical Sciences reported six deaths from influenza in the past month.

Officials also highlighted longer-term vulnerability. On December 14, 2025, an adviser to Iran’s Environmental Protection Organization said land subsidence threatens around 40 million people. In Tehran, he said, subsidence reaches as much as 36 centimeters per year in some districts, endangering infrastructure.

Infighting and the “protest trigger” question
Economic pain has sharpened elite blame-shifting. The daily Kayhan on December 14 accused the regime’s president Masoud Pezeshkian’s cabinet of imposing “artificial price hikes” and “justifying abnormal inflation,” while alleging corrupt or security-linked influence in advisory bodies. In parliament, lawmaker Hamid Rasaee on December 13, 2025 attacked the agriculture minister over alleged “inappropriate appointments,” backing impeachment efforts.

Even a senior presidential adviser, Ali Rabiei—a former intelligence official—warned on December 14 that years of stalled reform have piled up economic, social and cultural crises and widened the gap between society and decision-making, creating openings for opposition forces to exploit “real demands.”

Fuel prices remain a sensitive trigger. On December 14, the government-linked daily Setareh Sobh warned that raising gasoline prices without public preparation could reopen the “old wound” of nationwide unrest, referencing the November 2019 protests that followed a sudden hike. The paper said the government is considering increasing gasoline from 3,000 to 5,000 tomans.

Taken together, the week’s reporting from within Iran’s own media ecosystem depicts cascading vulnerabilities—economic, social, environmental and political—where each shock amplifies the next, and where the central question is increasingly not whether pressure is rising, but what might ignite it.

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