Patriotism or Betrayal: How the PMOI Prevented Deaths and Destruction During the Iran-Iraq War

Staff Writer4 hours ago
Patriotism or Betrayal: How the PMOI Prevented Deaths and Destruction During the Iran-Iraq War
In an interview aired on April 11, 2026,

iran nla mek army women (1)
Victorious female fighters of the National Liberation Army chant “Today Mehran, tomorrow Tehran” after liberating the strategic border city of Mehran on June 18, 1988
Written by
Mehdi Oghbai

In an interview aired on April 11, 2026, by the Voice of America’s Persian-language program “Omgheh Meydan,” Fahimeh Khezrheidari interviewed Mohammad Mohaddessin, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI), who underscored a fundamental principle of the Iranian Resistance: the liberation of Iran will come through the Iranian people and their organized resistance.

During the broadcast, the moderator pointedly questioned the PMOI’s historical relationship with the former Iraqi government, asking whether the organization had effectively sided with Iraq during the conflict.

In the interview, Mohaddessin stated that the PMOI/MEK’s record regarding Iraq is “clear and honorable.” He said that from the very first day Iraq occupied Iranian soil, the PMOI opposed that occupation in practice, not just in words. According to him, PMOI members fought Iraqi forces inside Iran, suffered casualties, and had prisoners of war who were released only years later. He also said that despite this, the regime itself moved against PMOI members even at the war fronts and tried to remove them from the front lines.

Mohaddessin further argued that the decisive turning point came when Iraqi forces withdrew from Iranian territory after the liberation of Khorramshahr in June 1982. From that moment on, he said, there was no longer any patriotic or defensive justification for the continuation of the war, and that was precisely the moment when peace should have been accepted. He argued that had the regime accepted a ceasefire then, the overwhelming majority of the human losses that followed could have been avoided.

Pezeshkian admits: PMOI rushed to defend Iran against Iraq in 1980, but regime blocked them.
He also emphasized that the Iranian Resistance did not simply criticize the continuation of the war from afar. It launched a peace campaign, issued peace statements, and later presented the National Council of Resistance of Iran’s peace plan. That plan recognized the 1975 Algiers Agreement as the basis for a just and lasting settlement and called for the question of war reparations to be handled through an international mechanism rather than through endless bloodshed.

Mohaddessin rejected the allegation that the PMOI/MEK went to Iraq as an auxiliary force of the Iraqi army. He insisted that the movement had no joint military operations with the Iraqi army, was not financed by Baghdad, and was not armed by it. He argued that the organization’s weapons were either purchased independently or captured from the forces of the Iranian regime in battle. He cited, as one example, the large quantities of weapons worth more than two billion dollars that were captured by the National Liberation Army during its 1988 operations.

This exchange in the interview provides an important lens through which to re-evaluate a controversial yet critical period in the history of the Iranian Resistance: its opposition to the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988).

While the clerical regime has long characterized the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran’s (PMOI/MEK) stance as a “betrayal,” a chronological analysis of the facts suggests the opposite. The PMOI’s daring move to champion peace when the regime demanded “War, War until Victory” was a strategic intervention that arguably saved hundreds of thousands of lives and prevented the total collapse of the Iranian nation.

 

Paving the Way: The Regime’s Provocation of Conflict (1979–1980)
The standard narrative often begins with Iraq’s invasion on September 22, 1980, but the Iranian regime spent the preceding 18 months actively provoking a conflict. Incapable of managing a post-revolutionary economy or meeting the democratic aspirations of the people, then-Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini viewed a foreign war as a “divine blessing” to consolidate power and stifle internal dissent.

Exporting Revolution: In 1979, the regime officially adopted the doctrine of “exporting the revolution,” specifically targeting the Shia population of Iraq.
April 1, 1980: A grenade attack at Baghdad’s Mustansiriya University, orchestrated by the Tehran-backed Al-Dawa party, targeted Iraqi officials. This was followed by a series of cross-border terror attacks.
April 8, 1980: Khomeini issued a formal decree calling on the Iraqi army to rise up and overthrow their government. This was interpreted internationally as a formal declaration of hostile intent.
September 4, 1980: The Khomeini regime initiated heavy artillery fire on Iraqi border towns (Zurbatiyah and Mandali), which Iraq cited as the functional start of the war.
By creating an existential threat, the regime successfully shifted the national focus away from the closure of universities (the “Cultural Revolution”) and the crackdown on political groups like the PMOI.

The 1982 Crossroads: From Defense to Ideological Crusade
The PMOI initially participated in the defense of Iranian territory, but the political landscape shifted in June 1982. After the liberation of Khorramshahr, Iraqi forces withdrew to the international border and Iraq officially accepted a ceasefire.

At this juncture, the “patriotic” duty to defend the soil had been fulfilled. However, in July 1982, Khomeini officially rejected the ceasefire and introduced the slogan: “The Road to Jerusalem passes through Karbala.” This was a pivotal moment where the war transitioned from a defensive struggle into an expansionist campaign. On July 13, 1982, the clerical regime in Iran launched Operation Ramadan, marking the first major military incursion into Iraqi territory.

Resolution 514 (July 12, 1982): The UN Security Council called for a ceasefire and a return to borders. Iraq accepted; Khomeini rejected.

The Wall of Rejection: Dismissing Peace Initiatives
Throughout the mid-1980s, the Iranian regime became the sole obstacle to peace, dismissing every international delegation that arrived in Tehran.

OIC Peace Committee (Feb 1981 & March 1982): Led by the leaders of Turkey, Pakistan, and Senegal. Iraq agreed to their terms; Khomeini refused to even meet some members.
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) (May 1982): A delegation of foreign ministers proposed a plan for immediate withdrawal and arbitration. Khomeini dismissed it as a “conspiracy.”
UN Special Envoy Olof Palme: The Swedish Prime Minister made multiple trips to Tehran. His efforts were consistently stonewalled by the Iranian leadership.
Chronology of Rejected UN Resolutions:

Resolution 479 (Sept 28, 1980): Called for an end to hostilities. Iraq accepted; Iran rejected.
Resolution 522 (Oct 4, 1982): Called for immediate withdrawal. Iraq accepted; Iran rejected.
Resolution 540 (Oct 31, 1983): Condemned attacks on civilian areas. Iraq accepted; Iran rejected.
Resolution 582 (Feb 24, 1986): Called for an immediate ceasefire. Iraq accepted; Iran rejected.
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The PMOI’s Diplomatic Counter-Offensive
While the regime used “Human Wave” tactics—sending thousands of children with plastic “keys to paradise” into minefields—the PMOI took a historic risk. In January 1983, chair of the NCRI Massoud Rajavi met with Iraqi Deputy PM Tariq Aziz in Paris. On March 13, 1983, the NCRI signed a formal Peace Treaty with Iraq based on the 1975 Algiers Agreement. Crucially, this proposal included Iraq’s readiness to pay for war damages, presenting a deal that clearly favored Iran and offered a viable path to prevent six more years of unnecessary bloodshed and the systematic destruction of the nation’s infrastructure.

To further bolster its diplomatic counter-offensive and isolate the regime’s warmongering on the world stage, the Iranian Resistance spearheaded a massive international campaign that successfully mobilized global opinion in favor of a peaceful resolution. This effort culminated in an unprecedented declaration of support, gathering the signatures of over 5,000 parliamentarians, prominent political leaders, and non-governmental organizations across the globe.

By securing the endorsement of such a vast and diverse cross-section of the international community, the PMOI effectively demonstrated that its peace plan was not merely a partisan proposal, but a globally recognized blueprint for stability based on international law. This diplomatic triumph stripped the clerical regime of its “patriotic” pretenses, exposing its isolation and proving that the international community viewed Khomeini’s insistence on “War, War until Victory” as the primary threat to the Iranian nation and regional security.

This move was revolutionary. It proved to the world that peace was within reach and that the sole remaining obstacle was the Khomeini regime. As former IRGC commander Ali Shamkhani admitted in a TV interview on September 23, 2005, the PMOI was the only entity in Iran that dared to stand against the war machine at a time when the rest of the political spectrum—including many purported opposition groups—was openly rooting for the “Sacred Defense.”

The Toll of Obstinacy: 1982 vs. 1988
The prolongation of the Iran-Iraq War by Khomeini’s regime after mid-1982 caused the vast majority of Iran’s suffering. The six-year extension turned a defensive victory into a bloodbath, producing most of Iran’s estimated 1 million deaths—far more than the roughly 100,000–200,000 lost in the initial defensive phase—and leaving millions wounded.

Economically, the obstinacy transformed a containable conflict into a $1 trillion catastrophe, according to Iranian claims including those associated with former President Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. The bulk of losses—destroyed infrastructure, massive forgone oil revenue, sanctions, and halted development—occurred after 1982, driving inflation to 50 percent, soaring unemployment, and deep austerity by 1988. All of this could have been largely avoided had the regime accepted peace when Iran’s borders were already secure.

The “Poisoned Chalice” of Necessity
The PMOI called on all Iranians opposed to the clerical regime who are willing to take arms and formed the National Liberation Army (NLA) in June 1987, shifting the pressure from the diplomatic halls to the battlefield. By executing over 100 military operations that decimated elite IRGC divisions and culminated in the liberation of Mehran in June 1988, the NLA presented an existential threat that no international body could match.

Ultimately, it was this organized, internal military pressure that stripped the regime of its ability to continue, with two major offensives by the NLA serving as the definitive catalysts.

The first, Operation Aftab (Shining Sun) in March 1988, dealt a staggering blow to the regime’s 77th Division in the Fakkeh region, demonstrating that the NLA possessed the tactical superiority to dismantle elite units and capture thousands of troops. This was followed by the decisive Operation Chelcheragh (Forty Stars) in June 1988, where NLA forces liberated the city of Mehran and routed the regime’s much-touted 16th Armored and 11th Amir al-Mo’menin divisions.

The echoing rally cry of “Today Mehran, Tomorrow Tehran” signaled a profound shift in the war’s trajectory—from a stagnant border conflict to an existential threat marching toward the capital. Faced with a disintegrating military and a resistance force capable of mobilizing a popular alternative, Khomeini was forced to abandon his expansionist crusade. Just one month after the fall of Mehran, he officially accepted the UN ceasefire, famously declaring his decision to “drink the poisoned chalice” only when it became clear that his survival was no longer guaranteed and the war was blessed no more.

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