Comprehensive Report on Day 18 of Hamid Noury’s Trial and Appeals Process

Amir2018TaghatiNovember 9, 2023
Comprehensive Report on Day 18 of Hamid Noury’s Trial and Appeals Process
The eighteenth day of the Swedish Court of Appeals for Hamid Nouri took place on Monday, October 6.

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Written by
Staff Writer

The eighteenth day of the Swedish Court of Appeals for Hamid Nouri took place on Monday, October 6. During this court session, the final defense was presented by Kenneth Lewis, the attorney representing the plaintiffs associated with the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK).

Hamid Nouri, a former torturer and prison guard for the Iranian regime, played a significant role in the mass killings of political prisoners in the summer of 1988. It’s important to note that ninety percent of those who were killed during this period were members and supporters of the PMOI.

The following report provides an overview of the key points and discussions during the court session:

 

Kenneth Lewis: We fully support the district court’s decision to impose a life sentence on Hamid Nouri, as there is substantial evidence confirming his criminal activities, which my clients have presented through their testimonies.
From our perspective, the conflict between the PMOI and the Iranian regime should not be categorized as an international armed conflict. Hamid Nouri’s conviction should be based on crimes committed in a non-international armed conflict.
The conflict between the PMOI and the Iranian regime began as a domestic war on June 20, 1981, marked by the regime’s suppression of peaceful protests, widespread arrests, and mass executions. According to regime officials, including Mostafa Pourmohammadi, this internal conflict has persisted to this day.
Mass executions commenced on the evening of June 20, 1981, and it was following these executions that the PMOI turned to armed resistance.
Much of the inaccurate information presented in court regarding the relationship between the PMOI and Iraq is attributed to an individual named Rouzbeh Parsi. Recently disclosed documents indicate that he was enlisted by the Iranian regime to disseminate false and misleading information to influence European countries.
There are other unfounded claims against the PMOI that are associated with a person named Anthony Cordesman. His allegations against the PMOI lack credible sources and essentially mirror the Iranian regime’s accusations. Cordesman’s content is both factually incorrect and contradictory.
Some of Anthony Cordesman’s allegations against the PMOI are supposedly derived from an article in The Philadelphia Inquirer. However, upon examining the original article mentioned by Cordesman, none of the falsehoods he attributed to the PMOI can be found.
Kenneth Lewis, relying on insights from various foreign correspondents who were on the ground, covering the Forty Stars Operation (a major military campaign conducted by the Iranian National Liberations Army), demonstrated the extent to which Cordesman’s claims regarding the involvement of Iraqi forces in PMOI battles are erroneous.
Kenneth Lewis, referencing international media sources, including The Washington Post from June 1988, provided evidence that the PMOI openly criticized [Iraqi] missile attacks on Iranian cities and residential areas.
The source of fabricated claims that the PMOI received financial, military, and logistical support from Iraq is Rouzbeh Parsi. Rouzbeh Parsi is associated with a group called the Iran Expert Initiative (IEI), which was established by the Iranian regime to influence Western governments and public opinion.

 

Kenneth Lewis cited Ambassador Lincoln Bloomfield’s testimony before the U.S. Congress in 2011, which took place before the PMOI was removed from the U.S. terrorist list. Bloomfield affirmed that, at no point during the Iran-Iraq War, including “Operation Eternal Light,” did the Iraqi military collaborate with PMOI forces.
Ambassador Bloomfield emphasized in his testimony that the PMOI (PMOI Organization of Iran) never cooperated in any joint operations with the Iraqi army or engaged in simultaneous operations in support of the Iraqi military.
In June 1986, the PMOI relocated to Iraq, and Massoud Rajavi, the founder of the NCRI, declared the formation of the National Liberation Army (NLA) in June 1987. From that point until at least 2003, the NLA was in a state of war with the Iranian regime This means that the PMOI had been engaged in a non-international armed conflict with the Iranian regime since 1981.
The NLA operated independently from the Iraqi government and military in its operations. This fact has been confirmed by numerous international reports, former Iraqi army generals, documents from the previous government, and reports from international law experts.
The fact that the PMOI was recognized as protected persons under the Fourth Geneva Convention after the downfall of the former Iraqi government indicates their independent activities in Iraq.
A Kuwaiti newspaper, Al-Qabas, published an article on April 11, 2009, authored by an Iraqi general named Wafiq Al-Samarraie, who served as the head of Iraqi military intelligence during the Iran-Iraq war. He stated, “The PMOI never carried out any military operation as part of the Iraqi forces against the Iranian forces.”
Wafiq Al-Samarraie, who left Iraq as a dissident after the war, and later became an advisor to the new Iraqi President, adds, “Whatever the PMOI did was a separate action with a distinct character. Their units were not integrated with the Iraqi units, and their forces did not participate in any operations in Iraq throughout the entire duration of the war, even individually.”
Kenneth Lewis: There have been allegations that the PMOI received financial support from Iraq. In this regard, I would like to remind you of the significant amounts of weaponry and other equipment that the PMOI, particularly during Operation Forty Stars, obtained from Iranian forces and had value in the billions of dollars.
We have presented numerous documents that demonstrate the PMOI covered their expenses and purchased weapons. The “Mojahed Magazine,” [an official outlet of the organization] issue 915, published a portion of these documents on June 25, 2008.
Kenneth Lewis presented two banking documents in court, showing that the PMOI transferred $8 million to the Iraqi government from a Swiss credit bank, and in return, they received dinars from Iraq to cover their expenses in the country.
Furthermore, Kenneth Lewis presented documents related to the PMOI’s purchase of weapons and ammunition from Iraq in the years 1992, 2000, and 2001. These documents indicate that the non-international armed conflict between the PMOI and the Iranian regime continued after 1988.
Kenneth Lewis presented a report from the CIA dated July 1993 regarding the PMOI organization’s presence in Iraq, which stated: “In early February 1992, UN arms inspectors investigated the main base of the National Liberation Army in Al-Khalis, known as Camp Ashraf. According to the inspectors’ report, this site was like an embassy, and the Iraqis regarded it as Iranian territory.”
Kenneth Lewis displayed a letter dated December 15, 1998, from the Secretary-General of the United Nations, addressed to the President of the UN Security Council, which stated, “Access to these sites was provided, and inspections were carried out except one facility that was under the control of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran. It was announced that the location of these facilities is not under Iraqi control.”

 

A letter dated September 9, 2002, from Iraqi authorities to the United Nations arms inspection agency in Iraq stated that the PMOI’s facilities in Iraq were not under the control of Iraq and belonged to the PMOI independently.
These documents not only prove the PMOI’s independence from Iraq but also demonstrate that the non-international armed conflict continued after 1988.
Kenneth Lewis mentioned the background of the internal conflict between the Mujahedin and the Iranian regime. He noted that up to three weeks before the downfall of the Shah’s regime, Massoud Rajavi and other PMOI leaders were imprisoned. Just five days after their release from prison, Massoud Rajavi, the leader of the Mujahedin, delivered his first speech at Tehran University. In this speech, he exclaimed, “Long live the democratic revolution of Iran!” However, Khomeini regarded the term “democratic revolution” as blasphemous and emphasized the “Islamic revolution” instead.
Since the people of Iran were aware of the PMOI’s struggles and sacrifices during the Shah’s era, the organization quickly transformed into a widespread party across Iran. They had offices in all Iranian cities, but in the early months, they were attacked repeatedly by pro-Khomeini mobs.
June 20, 1981, is one of the most important turning points in Iran’s history. On this day, the last peaceful protests against the Iranian regime were held, which the regime turned into a bloodbath. In Tehran alone, more than half a million people participated in these protests.
Khomeini ordered the Revolutionary Guards to open fire on the demonstrations. Dozens were killed, and hundreds were injured. Thousands were arrested.
Starting from the evening of June 20, a series of widespread executions targeted members of the PMOI and other opposition groups. The Ettela’at newspaper released photographs of 12 young PMOI girls who were executed, but their identities were not disclosed. The parents of these girls were instructed to retrieve their bodies.
Hossein Ali Montazeri [the Supreme Leader in waiting] expressed strong objections to the unprecedented and unlawful executions and the oppressive conditions in the regime’s prisons. He conveyed his concerns in a letter to the Supreme Leader Ruhollah Khomeini on September 27, 1981, where he stated, “Even executing 13-14-year-old girls for minor offenses without the use of weapons or involvement in protests is completely unjust. It is truly horrifying, and the pressure and unbearable torture are on the rise.”
It was the French newspaper “Le Figaro” that, in October 1981, prominently featured a front-page article about the execution of 200 children in Tehran. These executions, conducted in public squares and witnessed by the general public, were intended to instill fear and terror among the population.
At times, more than a hundred people were executed in a single night. According to accounts, especially from Mohammad Zand, a former political prisoner and member of the MEK (PMOI of Iran), officials at Evin Prison disclosed that over 1,800 individuals were executed in Evin Prison alone between September 27 and September 29, 1981. The total number of executions in 1981 and 1982 may even surpass the number of executions in 1988.

In 2006, the PMOI released a list containing the names and details of over twenty thousand members and supporters of the organization who were executed during those years. This list represents only a fraction of the approximately 100,000 individuals executed from 1979 until the present day.
The widespread arrests, torture, and mass executions occurred after the Revolutionary Guard opened fire on extensive demonstrations in support of the PMOI of Iran in Tehran on June 20, 1981. This marked the point where peaceful political activity was no longer feasible, prompting the PMOI of Iran to turn to armed resistance against the regime.
Iranian regime officials have repeatedly acknowledged the existence of this war in the streets of Tehran and various Iranian cities. Ahmad Vahidi, the current Minister of Interior, who was the first commander of the Quds Force, stated in a 1997 interview that the PMOI of Iran carried out 300 military operations against the Revolutionary Guard in Tehran every day.
On July 9, 1987, the Iranian regime launched a significant armed assault on the PMOI’s bases and offices in Karachi and Quetta, Pakistan, resulting in the death of several Mujahedin members. This incident clearly demonstrates that the international conflict between the regime and the PMOI extended beyond their activities in Iraq.
In March and April 1991, when the Gulf War was coming to an end, multiple brigades of the Revolutionary Guard initiated attacks on the PMOI bases in Iraq.
On April 6, 1992, thirteen Phantom fighter jets from the Iranian regime conducted an airstrike on Camp Ashraf, dropping 30 bombs on the camp’s facilities. This attack led to the destruction of many buildings, one fatality, and several injuries. Notably, the PMOI successfully downed one of the planes. This event made headlines in The New York Times on that day.
On April 19, 2001, the Iranian regime launched a major campaign of SCUD missile attacks on Camp Ashraf and other bases of the National Liberation Army along the Iran-Iraq border. Later, [then IRGC Chief and] a current military advisor to Khamenei Yahya Rahim Safavi, stated that 1,000 missiles had been fired at the PMOI bases. The Kayhan newspaper devoted its front page to this event.
On September 1, 2013, Iranian regime forces secretly attacked Camp Ashraf, which was in the process of being evacuated, and carried out a massacre, killing 52 unarmed members of the PMOI and taking seven others hostage, including six women. Their fate remains unknown.
In 2018, the Iranian regime intended to bomb a large gathering of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran organization in Villepinte, Paris. If successful, hundreds would have been killed, and thousands injured. Tens of thousands of people participated in this gathering. This plot was uncovered by the security forces of Germany and Belgium.
The conclusion is that the armed conflict between the Mujahedin and the regime, which began in June 1981, lasted much longer than the Iran-Iraq war and continued at least until 2003, even after the Mujahedin had no weapons.

 

Kenneth Lewis provided further details regarding the mass execution order issued by Khomeini, specifying that this order included instructions related to all “hypocrites,” which referred to the supporters of the PMOI in Iranian prisons.
Khomeini’s directive implied that anyone involved in classifying prisoners, including the Death Commission, judges in various regions, prison personnel, and prosecutors, were obligated to participate. Those individuals classified as PMOI supporters were subject to execution. This also encompassed Hamid Nouri, who served as a deputy prosecutor.
The text of Khomeini’s fatwa spans 240 words and comprises three main sections. The first part lists the “crimes” attributed to the PMOI and the issuance of a death sentence against its members. The second part delineates the measures for executing this order through a committee later known as the “Death Committee.” The third part underscores Khomeini’s recommendation and insistence on the need for decisiveness, strictness, and mercilessness when dealing with the Mujahedin.
Understanding the content of Khomeini’s order is of utmost importance, as this document is the most significant one that led to the mass execution of political prisoners affiliated with the PMOI in Iran. The document charges the Mujahedin with eight accusations and consequently declares that “those in prisons across the country who maintain their “hypocritical stance” are deemed as mohareb and sentenced to execution.”
The central point of this order is the phrase “insistence on the hypocritical stance,” and the sentences preceding and following this phrase provide justifications and details for the execution order.
The first three reasons cited in the order are explicitly linked to the beliefs and attitudes of the PMOI regarding Islam and are unrelated to political or military issues. These reasons are fundamentally in line with the definition of genocide, as they involve executing people based on their beliefs and religious views that reject the interpretations of the clerical dictatorship.
Among the eight reasons that Khomeini wrote in the religious decree, Operation Eternal Light (or Mersad, referring to the regime’s counter-attack) is not mentioned. The “conventional war” of the People’s Mujahedin of Iran” in the north, west, and south of the country,” which is explicitly stated in the fatwa, is certainly not a referral to Operation Eternal Light. Given the significance of the operation, mentioning it in the decree would suffice, while the rest of the reasons given would seem overdue.
The mass execution order by Khomeini was first mentioned in a telegram from Massoud Rajavi [NCRI founder] to the Secretary-General of the United Nations on August 25, 1988, with the following statement: “Based on credible information, Khomeini issued an execution order for political prisoners of the People’s Mujahedin Organization with his own handwriting several weeks ago.”

Subsequently, for 12 years, access to this document was restricted, and Iranian authorities remained silent about it until the text of this fatwa was published as Appendix 152 in Montazeri’s memoirs in 2000.
Following the issuance of the fatwa, Islamic jurists in several regions raised questions about the specifics and methods of its execution to Mousavi Ardebili, who was then head of the Supreme Judicial Council. In a brief 41-word text, Khomeini resolved all doubts regarding the necessity of “annihilating the hypocrites,” referring to the Mujahedin.
Despite the opportunity to end the war after the withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory in 1982 and Iraq’s interest in ending the conflict, Khomeini insisted on continuing the war to overthrow the Iraqi government and “liberate Jerusalem.” However, in the eighth year of the war, he was compelled to abandon this objective and accept defeat, which he referred to as “drinking from the chalice of poison.”
It appears that the decision to end the war and the decision to massacre the PMOI were made almost simultaneously. Khomeini wrote a letter to the people of Iran explaining the reasons for accepting the ceasefire in his own handwriting, dated July 15, 1988. This date, or a few days later, is the most likely date for the issuance of the mass execution order.
Concerning the scope of the executions, there are widely varying opinions. The PMOI, after summarizing hundreds of reports and examining the status of prisons before the massacre and the number of those released, concluded that approximately 30,000 political prisoners were executed during this massacre, with more than 90% of them being members of the Mujahedin.
In the early years following the massacre, there was little information about the scale of the executions. However, in recent years, many reports on the dimensions of this massacre have been published, with numerous reports indicating the execution of over 30,000 political prisoners during the summer of 1988.
I believe that there are serious shortcomings in presenting facts related to the activities of the PMOI in Iraq during the Iran-Iraq War and their involvement in international armed conflicts, as pointed out by some experts.

Before I became a lawyer, I was a research student in history. We were taught to always critically assess the reliability of sources. We shouldn’t form an opinion on a historical event without a source. If multiple sources contradict each other, we should discuss and evaluate them before concluding.
If the books of Anthony Cordesman, Dilip Hiro, and especially the testimony of Rouzbeh Parsi were examined by my history professor, they would all receive failing grades.
Cordesman and Hiro do not mention sources for their key claims against the PMOI but indirectly show through their references in their writings that they were well aware of differing perspectives on these key claims.
The worst of them is Rouzbeh Parsi, who, in his 10-page statement, has a total of three references, and these references do not confirm his key claims about important facts regarding the relationship between Iraq and the PMOI. In these cases, he has provided no sources.
I believe it is established that after June 20, 1981, there has been an ongoing non-international armed conflict between the People’s Mojahedin of Iran and the Iranian regime. This conflict continued at least until 2003, a time when the PMOI no longer had weapons, but it is still ongoing today, perpetuated by certain factions of the Iranian regime.

 

Comprehensive Report on Day 18 of Hamid Noury’s Trial and Appeals Process

Amir2018TaghatiNovember 9, 2023
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