Mohammad Sadat Khansari
Iranian diplomat-terrorist Assadollah Assadid
New information revealed about the case of Assadollah Assadi, Iran’s incarcerated diplomat-terrorist, suggests the mullahs’ network of espionage and terrorism is much wider in Europe than it appears. Thus, European officials should immediately act.
Assadi was arrested in July 2018 after delivering a bomb to a terrorist couple, Nasimeh Na’ami and Amir Saadouni, in Luxembourg and tasking them to plant the bomb in the “Free Iran” gathering of the Iranian opposition in Villepinte, north of Paris, France.
Germany’s policy arrested Assadi on July 1 before he could enter Austria, where he served as the third secretary of Iran’s embassy. The German authorities found a notebook in Assadi’s car with important information about the 2018 bombing plot, Assadi’s actions and travels, and amounts of money he had given to different Iranians.
According to the Deutsche Welle Farsi, the German Federal Criminal Court (BKA) is investigating Assadi’s activities on a mission from the German Attorney General.
The question is: Has Assadi commanded a large network of people tasked with different missions, including collecting news and espionage, in several European countries? For example, one of the notes refers to the Islamic Center of Hamburg as a touristic place. The BKA recognizes this center as one of the regime’s espionage and export of fundamentalism centers.
The information in his notebook suggests Assadi had 144 visits to Germany. Now the German authorities wonder why Assadollah Assadi travelled to Germany so much. Could he have met members of his network?
Another issue that caught the attention of the police is that Assadi had several receipts with him, indicating cash payments he made to some people. Recipients’ identities have not yet been determined, since they have used common Iranian names.
Iran’s diplomat & the largest terror plot in Europe. What was Assadollah Assadi’s role
For example, one of these individuals received 2500 Euros, another 5000 Euros and another person confirmed the receipt of a laptop. According to Deutsche Welle, the BKA authorities deduce that these payments could be the salaries of the regime’s agents.
Na’ami and Saadouni and another agent arrested regarding the 2018 bombing plot, Mehrdad Arefani, had received hundreds of thousands of euros.
According to the Belgian prosecutors’ indictment, during the last meeting between Assadi and the couple on June 28, 2018 in Luxembourg, Na’ami received the bomb, a new SIM card, and 180,000 euros. On June 26, 19,000 euros was wired to the couple’s account to cover the down payment of a 54,000-euro Mercedes car.
Arefani made 62 cash deposits in 2017 and 2018, with a total of 28,409.50 Euros, into his accounts. He deposited small amounts from various branches of the bank so as not to raise suspicion.
During the trial for Assadi and his accomplices on November 27 and December 3, the Belgian prosecutors revealed the three terrorists who worked with Assadi, despite having modest salaries, had made more than 100,000 euros in cash deposits to their various bank accounts.
Na’ami had 120,000 euros in her bank account and 35,000 euros in cash at her home. According to Belgian authorities, Na’ami and Saadouni received at least 66,000 euros from the MOIS every year since 2010. Na’ami received 35,000 euros in cash from Assadi and stashed it in her home a few days before the foiled bombing plot.
The new evidence and the “wealth of evidence” found in Assadi’s car and the terrorists’ houses in Belgium suggest that the mullahs in Tehran waste national wealth on terrorism. The evidence also shows how the regime used the European Union’s inaction to create and lead a large network of spies and terrorists across Europe.
The 2018 foiled bomb plot and Iran’s dismantled terrorist sleeper cell are just an example of how extensive the regime’s network in Europe is. In other words, the foiled bomb plot, despite its importance, is only the tip of the iceberg.
As long as the regime has its embassies and so-called cultural centers remain open, and its officials are able to travel to Europe, the regime will maintain its network of terrorism and espionage in Europe.
EU leaders should expel the regime’s agents, close its embassies and the so-called cultural centers, and ban the entry of all Iranian officials to Europe for their role in terrorism.