In 2022, Iran becomes a testbed for the real democratic alternative
One of the main characteristics of 2022 is the acceleration of the socio-political developments and the escalation of the confrontation between the Iranian regime and its opposition. This is reflected in remarks by Ebrahim Raisi as the regime’s president and the elimination of the so-called reformist faction.
Regime’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei had hoped Raisi would be able to curb the increasing protests. Now, one year into Raisi’s presidency, we see that Khamenei’s “Young Hezbollahi Government” has failed to reach its intended goals.
As the regime continues to sink into disarray, the more prevalent question is what the “alternative” to the regime would be like. This has become an important political issue today.
This is the reason why the regime and its intelligence service have started to portray the deposed and disdained Pahlavi regime as it’s the only possible alternative, hoping to marginalize its main opposition which the National Council Resistance of Iran (NCRI) and the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) embody.
Any alternative must meet four conditions:
- Competent leadership, accepted by most people
- A cohesive, nationwide, and broad organization with devoted supporters
- A clear and comprehensive plan for responding to the most important political, social, economic, and cultural issues
- Global support
In today’s balance of political power in Iran, by assessing all the names, currents, and opposition groups of the regime, it is possible to determine which of them are closest to these four conditions. This assessment can be made from two perspectives:
- The level of conformance of any current or group with these four conditions.
- The determination of the main enemy of the regime, to which of course the regime is constantly referring.
If we consider all these criteria, we can see that inevitably, there is only one group and one current that is truly opposing the Iranian regime. This means that none of the other currents, groups, or individuals have all these conditions to create a real opposition to the regime. And this is something to which many of them sometimes confess.
Therefore, on the one hand, we should analyze why the regime and its international lobbyists are promoting the Shah’s regime as the alternative to the mullahs’ rule, and on the other hand, we should analyze the role of the NCRI as the main opposition to the regime.
A major tactic of the regime’s think tanks is to divert public attention from focusing on the main problem in Iran, which is the regime itself. The regime regularly blames the U.S., Israel, and ISIS, but most importantly the MEK for the problems the mullahs are facing.
Considering the four conditions mentioned above we should ask:
Have the remnants of the Shah’s regime waged, let alone led, a constant, comprehensive, and professional struggle even for a week against the regime in the past four decades? Have they had any role in exposing the regime’s illicit activities, including its nuclear program, terrorist network, weapons of mass destruction, etc.?
After four decades, do they have a cohesive, nationwide, and inclusive organization with loyal supporters who are doing everything to reach the goal of a free Iran?
Have they presented a comprehensive plan to respond to the most important political, social, economic, and cultural issues of Iran?
Do they have global support, among parliamentarians and international political, scientific, and cultural figures?
Basically, what have they done to free the Iranian people from this tyranny, and what price did they pay to earn international support?
What major political project have they led successfully with all its complexities to be a competent leader of a free and democratic Iran in the future?
This shows that the remnants of the Shah’s regime meet none of the four conditions to be an alternative to the regime. But the interesting thing is that right after the former US Vice President Mike Pence visited Ashraf-3, their so-called supporters on social media, , have presented a plan to eliminate the MEK in their supposed future. It should be noted that not even once did Reza Pahlavi oppose and condemn such positions by his supporters while considering himself a freedom-lover and democrat. Instead, he seeks constantly to recruit members of the regime’s criminal Revolutionary Guards as the main body of his “future government.”
Contrary to this regime-led project, we are witnessing a real opposition with increasing support inside and outside of Iran reflected by its Resistance Units and international support by prominent figures from all around the world.
The least we can say is that, when the spell of the regime’s oppression is broken and people can express themselves freely, we will get a real measure of who will be the true alternative for establishing freedom and democracy in Iran.