The Real Goal of Iran’s Negotiations: Surviving, Not Settling

Written by
Shahriar Kia

The Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei poses with his loyalists: President Masoud Pezeshkian, Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, and Judiciary Chief Gholamhossein Mohseni Ejei on January 28, 2025
Three-minute read

The Iranian regime’s Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has been significantly weakened in recent months by internal crises and regional setbacks. To maintain his grip on power, he is employing a calculated strategy: avoiding meaningful concessions in negotiations with the U.S. while steering clear of conflicts that could incite internal unrest and threaten his regime’s survival. On January 28, after weeks of his officials signaling openness to negotiations, Khamenei himself took center stage. Speaking under the pretext of commemorating Prophet Muhammad’s mission, he made vague references to negotiations, framing them within a narrative of distrust.

Khamenei stated: “Behind diplomatic smiles, there is enmity, deep-seated malice, and a hidden wicked nature. We must open our eyes and recognize who we are dealing with, who we are negotiating with, and who we are speaking to. We must understand this and remain vigilant.”

This rhetoric contrasts sharply with his previous hardline stance. During Trump’s first term, particularly after the assassination of Qassem Soleimani, Khamenei categorically ruled out negotiations with the U.S., insisting that even if Tehran ever engaged with Washington, it would “never” be under Trump’s leadership.

Yet, in recent weeks, Khamenei has discreetly dispatched figures such as presidential deputy Mohammad Javad Zarif, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, and President Masoud Pezeshkian to publicly promote the idea of negotiations—albeit under the guise of “fair” and “reasonable” terms. Zarif, in an article for Foreign Affairs, even hinted at the possibility of reaching an agreement with the Trump administration, reinforcing the message in multiple appearances at the Davos conference.

As part of this strategic maneuver, the regime’s new foreign minister sought to artificially inflate the cost of negotiations, attempting to mask Iran’s inherent weakness. On January 28, in an interview with Sky News, Araghchi dismissed Trump’s recent remark that a “new agreement with Iran would be great” as insufficient, responding: “Given what happened with the previous agreement [the JCPOA], much more is needed to convince Iran to enter negotiations with the U.S. for a new deal.”

Araghchi further emphasized that the current situation is far more challenging than past nuclear negotiations: “A lot must be done by the other side to earn our trust… So far, we have heard nothing but kind words, and that is clearly not enough.”

Araghchi added: “The Islamic Republic will not necessarily reject all American proposals.”

 

On January 27, Deputy Foreign Minister Majid Takht-Ravanchi reiterated Tehran’s strategy, highlighting ongoing engagement with “friends” while preparing for the “worst-case scenario” in dealing with the new Trump administration. Speaking with ISNA news agency, he stated: “Once their policies are clear, we will act accordingly.”

A Regime Forced to the Table, But Not Ready to Deal
Khamenei’s regime has been driven to negotiations out of necessity, not willingness. Mounting domestic crises and internal divisions have put his rule in jeopardy. Rival factions within the Iranian elite—many of whom have been sidelined from key military and security decisions—accuse Khamenei of pushing the regime to the brink and advocate for making concessions to the West to preserve the regime. Meanwhile, factions loyal to Khamenei attack those pushing for talks, particularly Zarif, branding him a traitor and calling for his resignation.

By allowing these internal attacks, Khamenei is sending a calculated message to the West: the Iranian officials engaging in negotiations represent the most “reasonable” and pragmatic elements of the regime. This tactic is designed to bolster Tehran’s negotiating position and portray any potential agreement as the only viable path forward.

 

Yet beyond these political maneuvers, Tehran faces real existential crises. Weakened by widespread protests and strategic losses in the region, the regime lacks the leverage for meaningful negotiations. Khamenei does not consider its nuclear weapons program, ballistic missile capabilities, or regional influence as bargaining chips—these are the pillars of its survival strategy.

Khamenei’s negotiations are not about diplomacy; they are a time-buying exercise. His goal is to stall until another global crisis—whether in Ukraine, Gaza, or elsewhere—distracts the international community and provides the clerical regime with breathing room. This is a calculated deception aimed at prolonging the survival of a faltering regime.

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