The Clerical Regime’s Uphill Battle with the Next Uprising in Waiting

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Written by
Amir Taghati

On September 16, 2022, news made rounds that Mahsa (Jina) Amini, a 22-year-old Kurdish girl, had tragically become the latest victim of the regime’s escalated morality patrol operations, which ignited a society already brimming with resentment. In under a week, what began as localized protests quickly escalated to provincial levels, eventually engulfing the entire country in flames. State buildings and police cars were left in ruins, clerics were attacked, and security forces encountered resistance, and even suffered casualties. Despite tens of thousands of arrests and hundreds of state-sanctioned executions, the demand for the overthrow of Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the regime, remained resolute.

As the first anniversary of the 2022 uprising draws closer with each passing hour, two opposing fronts brace themselves for another faceoff. On one side, the people are fueled with determination, strategizing ways to coordinate, assemble, and initiate the upcoming wave of protests. On the other side, the regime is mobilizing all available resources to quell the inevitable storm and thwart its escalation.

Over the past few months, the regime has intensified efforts to suppress elements it perceives as potential sources of threat. Through the arrest of recently released political detainees, re-activating morality police patrols in metros and urban areas, the dismissal of schoolteachers, and even the undermining of Iran’s Bar Association by turning it into a government-controlled entity, the regime is conveying its intention to suppress dissent by any available means. Notably, the tally of state-sanctioned executions in 2023 reached 500 as of August 21.

Intellectual compass
Among these strategies is a focus on universities and students, who played a crucial part in the 2022 uprisings. They acted as the intellectual compass of society, steering the nation clear of the regime’s historical tactics of misleading dissent. According to a document published and circulated in Iran’s universities, the government of Ebrahim Raisi has initiated the process of recruiting 15,000 Basij members and regime supporters as academic faculty members. Simultaneously, numerous professors and faculty staff are being dismissed or sent to premature retirement.

In a statement, the regime’s Ministry of Interior defended the expulsion of independent professors from universities, stating, “What the Ministry of Science has undertaken against a few professors who have experienced academic stagnation but have played a significant role in media presentations, has been carried out based on legal criteria and, of course, is the revolutionary duty of this ministry.”

According to a report by the state-run Ensaf News on August 28, a significant number of “disciplinary cases” involving student activists has surfaced—nearly 200 cases. However, these students estimate that the actual count of such cases surpasses this figure considerably, nearing around 400 cases.

Beginning in early July, Tehran University, a major educational institution in Iran, announced its intent to enroll members of Iraq’s Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), also called Hashd-al-Shaabi. This militia, acting as an extension of Iran’s regime, has a track record of heinous crimes in Iraq and the region.

Alongside seeking enrollment in academia and pursuing other economically-focused privileges, those associated with the regime’s security apparatus have garnered increasing importance and heightened attention. In the past months, the highest-ranking officials of the clerical regime have initiated gatherings and assemblies, citing various pretexts, to elevate the spirits of individuals they consider guardians of the state.

Ali Asghar Daryaee, the Director General of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance in Kurdistan province declared on August 23 that they are implementing a systematic initiative to remove reporters, supposedly labeled as the “journalists’ refinement.” Previous reports dating back to mid-June indicate that similar initiatives had been launched in other provinces as well. While professions significantly impacting public opinion have always been closely monitored by the regime’s intelligence apparatus, these recent efforts signal that nothing is deemed secure anymore by the regime.

Aiming at radicalization
The clerical dictatorship initiated a harsh campaign against the most underprivileged areas in the nation, which held significant potential for revolt. The regime conducted hundreds of executions in the southeastern province of Sistan and Baluchistan, while its security forces continued to kill impoverished fuel porters who were struggling to make a living. The number of state-sanctioned killings in Kurdistan was also alarmingly high, and the regime’s border regiment in the western province frequently targeted impoverished freight carriers, known as ‘kulbars’.

Consequently, the regime inadvertently ignited a conflict it was fervently hoping to prevent. With the surge in the trafficking of weapons across the country, the casualties among security forces also escalated, resulting from confrontations with the public.

As reported by the state-run Tasnim news agency on August 23, quoting the commander of the regime’s State Security Forces, a total of 45 personnel were killed from the start of the Persian calendar year up to mid-August.

On August 28, Nasser Kanaani, the spokesperson of the Iranian regime’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, delivered a warning to the Iraqi government. He stated that “if the Iranian Kurdish parties in the Kurdistan region do not disarm by September 19, the Islamic Republic will take action.”

During the height of the 2022 uprising, as cities throughout Iran, particularly in Kurdistan province, were in revolt against the authority of the Supreme Leader, the Iranian regime reacted by launching missile strikes on Iranian Kurdish factions situated in the Iraqi Kurdistan region. The objective of this move was to suppress their backing of the intensified rebellion and compel them into silence.

Organized resistance
Conversely, the clerical dictatorship initiated an extensive and multi-pronged campaign against the Iranian Resistance. By escalating propaganda efforts both within and beyond Iran’s borders, coercing Western nations to exert pressure on the National Council of Resistance of Iran, and concocting false narratives about it, the regime aimed to sway two distinct audiences simultaneously. Toward its closely connected but demoralized supporters, it aimed to showcase authority and dominance over the regime’s most organized challenge. For the general population, the regime sought to impose a sense of desolation and loss of hope.

Meanwhile, as the regime’s internal factions fight for the steering wheel to navigate their fractured and weakened state through multifaceted and intertwined political and socio-economic crises toward safety, they reveal a great deal about their own vulnerabilities. And there is a watchful nation following closely how the regime’s desperate efforts play out and unfold.

However, the regime’s fear of the Iranian Resistance and society has led it astray in its assessments. Struggling for the past six decades despite shifting geopolitics, the resistance fighters have sacrificed and come too far to let go of their main focus, while the Iranian people have lost too much to have anything more to lose. Irrespective of a day on the calendar, they possess ample reasons and time for revolt.

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