Explaining Internal Drivers for Iran’s Attacks on Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria

iran pakistan attack january 2024
Written by
Mehdi Oghbai

In retaliation for the Iranian regime’s missile attack, Pakistan launched an attack against a village in Iran’s Sistan and Baluchestan Province on January 18, 2024
Four minutes read

In the last few days, the terrorist regime ruling Iran carried out simultaneous missile attacks on Iraq, Syria, and Pakistan. But unlike their usual denials of responsibility for the terror attacks of the regime’s proxy forces, state officials boldly claimed responsibility and state-affiliated media promptly broadcasted this move, asserting the fulfillment of the “hard revenge” promise.

In the aftermath of this political-military blunder, condemnations against the regime swiftly emerged. The Iraqi Prime Minister labeled the regime’s missile launches as a “hostile act” and the Iraqi Minister of Foreign Affairs Fuad Hussein told Al-Arabiya that “Iran, grappling with internal issues, is attempting to export its crises through such attacks.”

Iraq’s Foreign Ministry declared its intention to bring the regime’s attack before the UN Security Council. Masrour Barzani, the Prime Minister of the Kurdistan Region, declared, “I am in constant contact with the international community to halt these brutal attacks against the innocent people of Kurdistan.” Masoud Barzani, the head of the Kurdistan Democratic Party, added in a statement that the Supreme Leader’s goal and “those orchestrating these attacks is to divert attention from their own problems.”

In addition to Iraqi officials, the United Nations representative in Iraq, Matthew Miller, the spokesperson for the U.S. State Department, the UK Ambassador to Iraq, and a set of countries and personalities condemned the regime’s actions. While condemning the atrocities of the Iranian regime, Mrs. Maryam Rajavi, the President-elect of the National Council of Resistance of Iran called on the United Nations Security Council to punish the regime and place it under Article 7 of the United Nations Charter.

Fake revenge
Days before the recent criminal act by the regime, Gholamreza Qasemian, the head of the regime’s Parliamentary Documents Center, revealed in a speech that the entire scenario of launching missiles at the American base in Ain al-Asad, Iraq, following Qasem Soleimani’s death, was “fake” and fabricated. The regime profoundly promoted the incident, referring to it as a “blow to dignity,” a “strike against America’s superpower,” during Friday prayers on January 17, 2020, and dramatically naming that day “Yoam al-Allah” (“the day God’s wish is fulfilled” in Arabic).

Acknowledging the regime’s collapse in “social capital,” Qasemian stated, “The Ukrainian plane incident was retaliation for the fake operation in Ain al-Asad… If you seek revenge, hit hard! Don’t cozy up in a way that exposes it to everyone. Otherwise, everyone will understand it’s not a harsh revenge, and all officials have denied that it happened! Don’t do it like that. Hit something that pleases the true believers… If you don’t, your social capital won’t be there anymore. The system’s social capital won’t be there. That’s a cause for concern! You threw our Hezbollahi followers into the corner of the boxing ring, and you didn’t respond! Don’t delay action! You just keep shouting, who asked for your shouting?”

Following the killing of former IRGC Quds Force commander Qasem Soleimani, the regime’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei vowed “harsh revenge.” However, instead of fulfilling this promise, the regime launched a few missiles into the deserts of Ain al-Asad in western Iraq’s al-Anbar province. Former US President Donald Trump later stated explicitly that the attack was coordinated with the US and posed minimal threat to American forces. This indicated that the promised harsh revenge was an empty gesture, showing Tehran’s reluctance to escalate tensions further. Instead of realizing grand promises, the regime opted to broadcast computer-generated imagery animations of Qasem Soleimani and harsh revenge for its domestic audience.

As a result, many insiders and individuals serving in the regime’s oppressive apparatus are demanding accountability from top state officials. In January 2022, the student Basij of three major universities in Tehran invited the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council to attend the university and provide explanations about the status of pursuing the “harsh revenge” case. They wrote, “Today, on the second anniversary of the martyrdom of the commander, the martyr Lieutenant General Haj Qasem Soleimani, and considering the continuation of the heinous crimes and aggressions of the enemies in the past two years, we invite you, in the capacity of the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, to attend a gathering with Basij students to explain the status of the ‘harsh revenge’ case. Who exactly is responsible for it, and why are the people not informed about its details?”

Internal turmoil led to external crises
Examining the internal pressures mostly occurring discreetly within the regime, it becomes evident why state officials and certain media outlets aligned with Ebrahim Raisi’s administration are willing to risk adverse international consequences. This is why they emphasize the Iranian regime’s involvement in the October 7 attacks and the ongoing Middle East crisis even though they might be compelled to backpedal the same a few hours later. This is why they engage in explanatory rhetoric, offering empty promises and bold excuses, similar to Kayhan newspaper, which claims, “By harsh revenge, we mean the expansion of the Islamic Revolution.”

For the last three months, Ali Khamenei has grappled with devastating challenges. The loss of key figures, including Razi Mousavi, close to Qasem Soleimani, and the demise of many leaders from other proxy groups, was the result of a gamble intended to conclude in 22 or 33 days and enhance Khamenei’s position in the Middle East. However, it has now left him entangled in the flames of a crisis he is the most to blame.

While Khamenei’s theatrical display of power is primarily geared toward a domestic audience, its repercussions extend beyond his control. Targeting neighboring nations that have yet to confront his transgressions, he aims to deflect accountability. By launching a few missiles and causing harm to citizens of Iraq, Syria, or Pakistan, Khamenei intends to mask his vulnerabilities and inertia, assuring his mercenaries that he has exacted “harsh revenge” for the lives lost while securing his rule.

He relies on their support to counter the Iranian people’s uprising, confident that, despite international condemnation, there is no existential foreign threat capable of undermining his authority. Similar to his predecessor, the monarchical dictator, Khamenei recognizes that his primary threat lies not with the United States or Pakistan but with the people of Iran.

 

Explaining Internal Drivers for Iran’s Attacks on Pakistan, Iraq, and Syria

 

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