Iran’s Regime Faces Serious Domestic Challenges Following Damascus Embassy Strike

Written by
Shahriar Kia

Three-minute read

Authorities in Iran held funeral services on Wednesday for two generals from the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps who had been killed the previous day in an apparent Israeli strike on the Iranian embassy in Damascus. Meanwhile, the official death toll from that strike rose to at least 16, including several other Iranians and an officer from the regime’s Lebanese militant proxy, Hezbollah.

While the Iranian regime celebrated the two deceased generals, international media provided additional information about their backgrounds and roles both within the IRGC and in Syria, where the hardline paramilitary group was instrumental in preserving the government of Bashar al-Assadi through a years-long, multilateral civil war.

Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi had reportedly served as head of the Syrian and Lebanese division of the IRGC’s foreign special operations wing, the Quds Force, until 2016. He was killed in Tuesday’s strike alongside his deputy, General Mohammad Hadi Hajriahimi. While Hezbollah provided little information about its own eliminated member Hussein Youssef, it did publicly credit Zahedi with a crucial role in helping to “develop and advance the work” of that group within Lebanon.

Zahedi’s broader role in the IRGC apparently involved the facilitation of weapons transfers and associated military support from Tehran to its militant proxies, as well as assistance in creating strategies for the regime’s so-called “Axis of Resistance.” Zahedi’s presence in Damascus implies that other IRGC officers had already assumed the roles he had previously played inside Iran, but reports indicate that he had indeed been heavily involved in the suppression of domestic dissent, including during the nationwide uprising of November 2019 which led to roughly 1,500 Iranian civilians being shot dead by the IRGC. Three years earlier, he appeared in a video shot by the IRGC which depicted joint exercises between it and the police and showcased both the strategies and the views of paramilitary operatives toward public protests and expressions of dissent.

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The IRGC’s function both as a tool of domestic repression and as a promoter of international terrorism has fueled calls for it to be designated by Western governments as a foreign terrorist organization.

While various regime officials have initiated harsh rhetoric regarding retaliating against the United States and Israel, the regime’s inaction in response to all previous incidents has caused significant concern and frustration among many internal elements of the regime.

Naser Torabi, who has been designated as an expert on West Asian affairs by state television, said, “My point is that when our enemy strikes us to such an extent that this issue becomes the headline in the global public opinion, everyone is watching and monitoring us. The response must be at the same level. If you say I hit somewhere, sometimes… they themselves are the ones that hit. This will at least make you lose the game in your own public perception. The four effects that I mentioned earlier, one of them is the internal security domain. One of them is the economic domain. It puts you in a medium and long-term situation. It will have an effect of frustration among our internal forces.”

Criticizing the regime’s official lip service about the Damascus strike, Jalal Rashidi Kuchi, a member of the regime’s parliament, said, “Delay, patience, and hesitation in a decisive and similar response to the Zionist regime’s military attack on Iranian soil, under any pretext, is tantamount to a severe blow to Iran’s great honor and dignity.”

Mohammad Taghi Aghayan, another strategic affairs expert, appeared on state television on April 1, stating, “They killed martyr Soleimani, we said we would take harsh revenge. Instead, they took revenge. Further, they killed Seyed Razi and we still vowed to take a harsh revenge. They killed Mr. Arouri. They targeted Hashd al-Shaabi officials. They targeted Hezbollah officials, but we still talked about harsh revenge and patience. We claimed that “we will hit where you expect the least.” At the end of the day, I have a hard time understanding when and where are they going to stop expecting so that our revenge might occur!”

Therefore, the clerical regime, which viewed itself as the primary beneficiary of the Middle East conflict, now faces a critical decision point. Failing to respond adequately or reacting insufficiently will exacerbate its internal morale crisis and strengthen the increasingly vocal dissent. On the other hand, any response risks escalating the situation to the point of a full-scale war, endangering the regime’s survival.