Behind Reza Pahlavi’s Plan for Iran: Authoritarian Rule

Written by
Wes Martin
In this assessment, Wesley Martin, Colonel (Retired) and former Senior Antiterrorism Officer for all Coalition Force – Iraq, portrays Reza Pahlavi’s Iran Prosperity Project as an authoritarian scheme wrapped in the language of democratic change. Col. Martin argues that Pahlavi falsely presents himself as both “Crown Prince” and “Leader of the National Uprising” while constructing a transitional model that would place extraordinary power in his own hands: appointing the National Uprising Council, controlling the leadership of all three branches, and governing through “temporary laws” for up to 180 days. Martin’s central warning is devastating: this is not a path to democracy, but a formula for replacing one dictatorship with another.

Assessment Report
Pahlavi Plan for Iran
Purpose: In July 2025, Reza Pahlavi released a 169-page document titled: Iran Prosperity Project, Emergency Phase Booklet. This assessment is an analysis of the hidden agenda inadvertently exposed through Reza Pahlavi’s own words within his document.
Background:
Among other titles, Reza Pahlavi declares himself as the Crown Prince of Iran. This self-declared title has no foundation. His father, Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, abdicated the throne in 1979, went into exile with his family, and died of cancer the following year. Off the immense wealth Mohammad Reza Pahlavi embezzled before fleeing Iran, the Pahlavi family has lived a life of luxury up to and including now.
It must be remembered that the Pahlavi family came back into supreme power of Iran in 1953 through a coup organized by Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, America’s Central Intelligence Agency, and Britian’s MI-6. The reason behind the 1953 coup was that then-Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh had nationalized the Iranian oil industry and required British Petroleum and any future exporters to commence paying fair market value.
Immediately upon the Pahlavi family’s 1979 flight from Iran, there was a brief window of opportunity for democracy to return to Iran. That opportunity came to a violent end when Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini returned to Tehran from exile in Paris. Almost immediately the entire country fell to the religious extremists. The result was the Islamic Republic of Iran. The citizens of Iran went from one brutally oppressive government to one even worse.
As evidenced by massive demonstrations in January 2026 and widespread uprisings in recent years, the fundamentalist government is crumbling. Like a phoenix rising out of his own family’s ashes, Reza Pahlavi is presenting himself as the natural and most qualified person to immediately take the reins of leadership in Iran. With this comes the second title he has awarded himself: Leader of the National Uprising.
Executive Summary:
The opening page identifies the book’s authors and other team members. The vast majority of these are too young to have lived during the Pahlavi monarchy. None of them, as with well over ninety percent of Iranians alive today, are old enough to remember life prior to the 1953 coup.
The latter sections of Pahlavi’s Iran Prosperity Project, Emergency Phase Booklet does provide a starting point analysis of actions that must be taken to stabilize Iran. These sections also provide an overview of problems that will certainly surface after the fall of the current government. Many of these problems are over seven decades old, having existed inside the corrupt and dysfunctional authoritarian systems of both the Pahlavi monarchy and the fundamentalist regime.
American President Ronald Reagan correctly stated: Freedom is a fragile thing and it’s never more than one generation away from extinction. For over seven decades, three generations of Iranians have been denied their right to democracy. Through his own words, Reza Pahlavi makes it clear he wants to deny democracy to the citizens of Iran for at least one more generation in his quest to regain his father’s abdicated monarchy.
Pahlavi’s plan of action starts at the very beginning with his declaring himself as the only person to lead Iran into the future. In Iran Prosperity Project, Emergency Phase Booklet, Pahlavi claims that sole control of the government and ruling it through appointments of his choosing will be a “temporary” measure. Six months of unchecked power is all he needs to set in motion his quest to change his title from “Crown Prince” to “Shah.”
In Iran Prosperity Project, Emergency Phase Booklet, Reza Pahlavi wastes no time in declaring himself as the heir-apparent leader of Iran and the force behind the January 2026 unrest. Immediately after brief bullet statements provided in Section 1’s Transitional Government Objectives and Section 2’s Top Areas of Focus, Reza Pahlavi commences his narrative.
Section 3: Political Process and Framework for Transition From the Islamic Republic (page 6).
a. Direct quotes:

(1) Paragraph 1: …Crown Prince Reza Pahlavi, in his role as the leader of the national uprising (hereinafter “Leader of the National Uprising”) and with the aim of overseeing the transitional period establishes two institutions. (page 6)

National Uprising Council: This council shall serve as an advisory body and act as the policy decision-making arm of the Leader of the National
Uprising. Members will be chosen from both inside and outside Iran. (page 6)

Temporary Executive Team: This team shall be responsible for implementing policies and executing the decisions of the Leader of the
National Uprising. Members will be chosen from both inside and outside Iran. (page 6)

(2) Paragraph 2: Due to security concerns stemming from the Islamic Republic’s notorious record of eliminating dissidents, the members’ identities shall not be disclosed until after the fall of the regime. (page 6)

(3) Paragraph 3: Following the fall of the Islamic Republic through a national revolution by the people of Iran with the support of honorable military and law enforcement forces, the country shall be governed during the transitional period by the Transitional System (comprising three institutions), under the leadership of the Leader of the National Uprising. The three institutions include the National Uprising Council (serving as the legislative branch), the Transitional Government (serving as the executive branch), and the Transitional Divan (serving as the judiciary) (page 6).

(4) Paragraph 4: The appointment and dismissal of the heads of all three institutions shall take place only after the proposal by the National Uprising Council (which requires an absolute majority vote of its members) and the approval of the Leader of the National Uprising…(page 6)

(5) Paragraph 6: Members of the National Uprising Council, reflecting the diversity of the united Iranian nation, will be appointed by the Leader of the National Uprising. (page 7).

(6) Paragraph 7 and 7.4: The Council’s responsibilities include, but are not limited to: Enacting temporary laws necessary for managing the country during the transitional period. (page 7).

b. Assessment:

(1) Despite putting his two self-proclaimed titles up front, Reza Pahlavi cannot be the crown prince of a monarchy his father abdicated. The monarchy no longer exists. Furthermore, Reza Pahlavi is not the leader of the national uprising. He is attempting to claim credit for something he did not create.

(2) As expressed in his plan, Reza Pahlavi appoints the National Uprising Council. From this council, Raza Pahlavi receives the names of the heads of the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government. It is made clear that in his plan, Reza Pahlavi has the right to reject the names provided to him. This is no different than what the Iranian people are going through now with approval of appointments and acceptance of candidates having to be blessed by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei.

(3) Paragraph 2 acknowledges that Pahlavi has already determined who of his obedient followers will be on the National Uprising Council and the Temporary Executive Team. This is further confirmed in paragraph 6 with Pahlavi specifically stating he has sole authority to appoint the National Uprising Council.

(4) Paragraph 7.4 is a concern. Enacting temporary laws necessary for managing the country during the transitional period. This statement cannot help but bring back memories of Hitler’s 1932 Enabling Act (“Gesetz zur Behebung der Not von Volk und Reich“ – translated as “Law to Remedy the Distress of People and Reich”). Enabling Act laws did not require parliamentary approval and were allowed to deviate from the constitution. Pahlavi’s “temporary laws” also do not require a sanity check, other than by his appointees and ultimately himself.

(5) Another concern is the transitional government (under the Leader of the National Uprising/Crown Prince Pahlavi) is programed to last between 100 and 180 days. During this time, he will address fifteen identified areas. Included in those fifteen areas is the military and security, which will be analyzed in paragraph 5 of this assessment. The concern is 100 to 180 days provides Pahlavi enough time to replace Islamic regime officials with his own loyalists.

Section 4: Legal Process and Framework for Transition from the Islamic Republic (page 15).
a. Direct quotes:

(1) Paragraph 2. Three legal frameworks are available:

Restoring Option: It repeals all laws enacted by the Islamic Republic authorities and immediately reinstates the laws in force during the reign of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi.
Retaining Option: It retains the Islamic Republic laws, deferring modernization to an elected parliament in the future.
Hybrid Option: It retains the Islamic Republic laws by default during the transitional period while repealing specific laws and provisions that either symbolize the Islamic Republic or impede the Transitional Systems’ progress.
(2) Paragraph 3: This White Paper demonstrated that the Hybrid Option best meets the key criteria for an ideal framework…

(3) Paragraph 4: The Hybrid Option does not draw inspiration from notable examples of regime change over the past five decades, such as the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, the 2003 removal of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, or the 2011 revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt.

(4) Paragraph 5: Instead, the Hybrid Option takes inspiration from Britian’s experience with Brexit. Although it did not involve a regime change, Brexit led to a fundamental and substantive change in the British legal system.

(5) Paragraph 35. The National Uprising Council will issue an Official Decree consisting of three parts (pages 22 and 23)

Paragraph 35.1. Part 1: Dissolving the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, along with all (or many of) its institutions. From a legal perspective, this act officially establishes the Transitional System and creates the necessary break from the old regime to gain international recognition and support.
Paragraph 35.2. Part 2: Announcing that, despite the dissolution of the Constitution, all existing laws–except those explicitly listed in Part 3 (or announced at later stages)–will remain in effect during the transitional period to maintain stability in the nation’s affairs.
Paragraph 35.3. Part 3: Repealing a specified number of laws or provisions thereof. This signals the beginning of a new era for the nation and sets the stage for future modernization.
b. Direct quotes:

(1) Pahlavi claiming his “hybrid option” takes inspiration from Britian’s experience with Brexit is totally flawed. The following analysis of that claim is from Honorable Struan Stevenson, former Member of European Parliament representing Scotland:

Pahlavi’s assertion that Brexit produced a “fundamental and substantive change” in the British legal system is simply incorrect. Brexit was engineered to ensure maximum legal continuity, not systemic transformation. Through the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018, nearly all EUderived law was copied wholesale into domestic law. On the day after Brexit, the substance of UK law was overwhelmingly identical to the day before.
The UK’s legal system retained all its core features: parliamentary sovereignty, the common law tradition, judicial independence, constitutional continuity, and the same courts interpreting the same rules. No constitution was replaced, no legal order dismantled, and no governing framework reinvented. Removing the supremacy of EU law altered an external constraint, not the internal structure of the legal system itself.
EU law was never the British legal system; it was a limited supranational overlay applied through UK institutions. Its removal changed the source of some regulations, not the nature of the system that creates, interprets, and enforces law.
Brexit therefore represents legal adjustment within continuity, not a foundational rupture. To invoke it as evidence of a “hybrid” path to postregime governance fundamentally misreads both Brexit and the meaning of substantive legal change.
(2) In his attempt to examine and fabricate examples by selectively going back fifty years, Pahlavi should have gone back eighty in which he could also have examined the Federal Republic of Germany’s recovery from Nazi tyranny. It is obvious Pahlavi did not wish to go back eighty years. That would have begged the question as to why he did not examine his father’s conspiracy to become supreme ruler through overthrowing the government of Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Mosaddegh.

(3) Concerning the provisions established in Paragraph 35, it must be remembered that Pahlavi has already declared himself Leader of the National Uprising. As discussed in Section 4b, Pahlavi makes it clear that all members of the National Uprising Council will be personally selected by him, and all their decisions must gain his approval. Again, this echoes of Adolph Hitler’s Enabling Act.

Conclusion:
Later sections of Reza Pahlavi’s Iran Prosperity Project, Emergency Phase Booklet, reads like campaign promises. These sections provide an overview of issues that need to be identified and worked to prevent further tyranny, chaos, and bloodshed following the collapse of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Resolving these problems will require unity of effort, not a dictatorship that “promises” to remain in power only for a limited time.
Upon seizing ultimate power in Nazi Germany, Adolph Hitler proclaimed himself to be “Fuhrer and Reichskanzier” (Leader and Chancellor of the Reich). Reichskanzier was soon dropped. Pahlavi proclaims himself to be “Leader of the National Uprising and Crown Prince of Iran.” Should Pahlavi be afforded the path to reclaim his father’s abdicated monarchy, there should be no doubt the words will be permanently consolidated to “Leader of Iran.” This similarity cannot be ignored. Another fact that cannot be ignored is that not once has Reza Pahlavi condemned the human rights abuses against the citizens of Iran committed under the rule of his father.
For centuries global history has proven that rather than producing democracies, revolutions usually produce authoritarian states. Under the guise of reform and democracy, return to “temporary” authoritarianism is exactly the opportunity Pahlavi’s plan provides should he be afforded total control of the Iranian government following the collapse of the existing regime.
During the final days of the American Revolution at the Continental Army’s encampment in Newburg, New York, among the officer corps there was a conspiracy developing to overthrow Congress and make General George Washington supreme ruler of the entire country. Upon discovering the plan, General Washington immediately put an end to it and advised his officers to express your utmost horror and detestation of the man, who wishes under any specious pretenses to overturn the liberties of our country.
The people of Iran should apply those same words to Reza Pahlavi. Recognizing Reza Pahlavi’s manifesto for what it is, citizens of Iran should express their utmost horror and detestation of the man, who wishes under any specious pretenses to overturn the liberties that should come to the country once the Islamic Republic of Iran has collapsed. The way to the democratic future of Iran will not be achieved by returning power to the self-renounced monarchy of decades past.
Original signed

Wesley Martin, Colonel (Retired), former Senior Antiterrorism Officer for all Coalition Force – Iraq