Leaked Files Give Unprecedented View of the Iranian Regime’s Analysis Apparatus
iran human rights diplomacy (1)
Written by
Staff Writer
A recently obtained insider report from the Iranian regime, marked as “confidential” and acquired by the Iranian dissident group “GhyamSarnegouni,” provides valuable insights into the thinking rooms of the Iranian regime. Through infiltrating the websites and servers belonging to the regime’s Presidential Organization, the group has gained access to internal communications of the highest officials and their decision-making processes. This report sheds light on the mindset of the regime’s leaders, offering a glimpse into their evaluation of domestic threats and their dealings with international opponents.
The report elucidates the regime’s motivations behind its pursuit of nuclear weapons, emphasizing the need to use these capabilities to secure a position in the evolving global order. It also reveals the underlying mindset driving the regime’s “look to the east policy,” which seeks to emulate China’s geo-economic strategies. However, in light of the regime’s deep concerns regarding popular uprisings, these policies are likely to manifest in increased social control measures, particularly in the realm of internet censorship and surveillance, which are seen as crucial for what the regime deems “security” in its shaky hold on power.
Moreover, the analysis highlights the impact of international sanctions on the regime’s agenda and emphasizes how the international community’s support for the uprising can increase the cost of the regime’s oppressive machinery, while significantly hampering Western appeasement. Additionally, the report sheds light on the regime’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which is officially tasked with facilitating Western inaction and ensuring other countries turn a blind eye to the severe human rights violations within Iran.
However, it becomes evident that the strategic calculations outlined in the report do not align with the socio-economic realities on the ground. The analysis also reveals a strong pattern of blaming the United States for the country’s challenges, suggesting serious blind spots and negligence within the regime’s leadership.
Presidential Strategic Studies Center
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES
No 4933/M
Date 24 – 4 – 2023
Time: 14:01
Classification: Confidential
Urgency
Attachment: Positive
In The Name of Almighty
Dr. Abdollahian
Honorable Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Greetings and happy Eid al-Fitr.
Please find attached the “Report on the strategic threats and opportunities of the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1402 (Persian calendar, equivalent to March 2023 – March 2024).” This report has been prepared by the Presidential Center for Strategic Review and is provided for your information and use.
Abuzar Gohari Moghadam
Political and International deputy
Tehran, East Pastor St., Corner of Khursheed Street No. 52, PO Box 318-13165 Phone: 9-64453046 FAX 66403816
www.css.ir [email protected]
Introduction
The Islamic Republic of Iran faces a situation at three levels: internal, regional, and international, which will have a significant impact on the country’s destiny in terms of decision-making and actions in response to current trends and events. In these complex circumstances, understanding the path and devising strategies requires a comprehensive approach to threats and opportunities simultaneously. A one-dimensional perspective based on threats will create an inaccurate perception that the country is in a state of “deadlock.” The most significant consequence of this perception will be passive behavior, which may also reinforce a pessimistic outlook. Solely focusing on opportunities will lead to neglecting enemies and conspiracies. The desired approach is to identify key issues and challenges while planning precisely to seize opportunities and mitigate threats.
A. Challenges and opportunities of the country’s foreign policy and security in the year 1402
The most important challenges and opportunities in the foreign policy and security of the country in the year 1402 can be summarized in the following framework:
Limited window of opportunity for active participation in the new global order
The change in the international order over the past decade has been marked by the decline of American hegemony and the emergence of new players such as China. However, in recent years, crises such as the COVID-19 pandemic, the war in Ukraine, and technological advancements have accelerated the pace of geopolitical and geo-economic transformations. With this ongoing trend, the new order will take shape sooner than previously predicted. Even the Americans acknowledge in their official assessments that the next decade will be crucial in determining the fate of the new order. Therefore, the window of opportunity for active participation in shaping the new international order is limited.
The most significant challenge in this transitional period of the global order is the increased likelihood of conflicts among state actors in the geopolitical space. Concerns over fundamental threats and efforts to preempt or seek opportunities for power projection have raised the level of risk tolerance among countries. Consequently, being exposed to limited and extensive military confrontations for actors like the Islamic Republic of Iran, which are at the center of these developments, is not unlikely. Therefore, strengthening deterrence becomes an essential principle in facing the challenges of the new international order. It is vital to note that improving defensive and offensive capabilities and technological advancements will enhance deterrence when confronting enemies and…
Other actors should come to the conclusion that Tehran has a serious political will to use these capabilities and equipment timely and bear the mutual cost.
Although the transitional period of the international order has often been accompanied by military conflicts, the formation of a new order and its continuity requires more than victory in conflicts or avoiding engagement-related damages. In fact, the change in order does not merely occur at the political and military levels, and deterrent tools alone are not sufficient for active participation in the new order. It is necessary to establish a new structure in the international system that possesses economic capabilities and proactive initiatives. Therefore, the most significant challenge for the United States vis-à-vis China is not limited to the military and political aspects but rather in terms of economy and technology. In other words, the Islamic Republic of Iran, for its role in the new order, needs to adopt a proactive approach, in addition to its systemic opposition and undermining of the American order and its domineering nature. It means that being a participant in the international order not only requires new ideas for change but also necessitates having capabilities and proactive tools that can facilitate the establishment of a new long-term structure.
According to this perspective, the most significant indication of a change in the international order, in terms of geo-economics, for the Islamic Republic of Iran is not to protect the economy from conditional dependence on external developments and vulnerability to international shocks and pressures. Instead, a coherent plan should be devised that, while meeting domestic needs and resisting external pressures, enables Iran to play an international role. This means that just as in West Asia, it is not possible to create a new order without considering Iran, in the economic dimension as well, a meaningful role for the country should be defined at the regional and international levels.
Defining a new role depends on outlining a vision that is appropriate for Iran’s current and future economic and social situation. In drawing this vision, a role should be defined for Iran that not only addresses the challenge of Iran lagging behind in development and economic growth but also encompasses issues such as unemployment and the phenomenon of brain drain. Moreover, it should have the capability to establish strategic relations with emerging powers, especially China. In this regard, establishing Iran as a developed country with an advanced industrial system, as compared to an oil-dependent Iran, can not only meet domestic economic and social needs but also provide a more precise and deeper foundation for laying the groundwork for strategic relations with emerging powers, including China.
From this perspective, Iran’s most significant advantage lies in its abundant human resources and the utilization of an adaptable industrial system. Similarly, in this new perspective, China will not be just an oil-buying country but a high-capacity industrial nation that needs to shape new regional value chains to sustain its economic growth and maintain its leading position in global production. This entails reducing its dependence on the United States and Europe and preserving its competitive advantage by cost-saving measures. Essentially, bilateral relations should be designed in a way that China’s position as the world’s factory aligns with Iran’s transformation into the West Asian factory.
In this vision, Iran’s long-term goal is not only to become a fast, low-cost, and secure international transit route for the trade of other countries but also to play a pivotal role in the production and export of factory goods by creating industrial poles and clusters along international corridors. By giving new meaning to the East-West corridor, Iran’s participation in the Belt and Road Initiative is not merely about connecting two geographical points but actively engaging in research and development, production, marketing, and sales of industrial products.
The most significant concern that can lead to strategic alignment between Iran and China in the future is the convergence between China’s need for continued economic growth and shaping a new value chain and Iran’s vision of becoming the factory of West Asia. In fact, Iran can define a significant part of its industrial development strategy and technological transformation program through joint cooperation between Iranian and Chinese companies along the Belt and Road Initiative route. By learning from and transferring China’s experience and technology within a timeframe of 5 to 10 years, Iran can become a major industrial producer in the region. Therefore, any collaboration deal with China should be designed with a focus on shaping an advanced industrial system in Iran and playing a role in the Chinese value chain. To achieve this vision and implement the strategic partnership deal, Iran needs to transform its cooperation in energy and transit into a platform for achieving the goal of becoming an industrialized country with advanced technology. Specifically, in this new initiative, two geographical points in Iran, the coasts of Makran and the areas surrounding the Sarakhs-Razi transportation route (along the cities of Mashhad, Semnan, Tehran, Alborz, Qazvin, Zanjan, Tabriz, and Urmia), will be transformed into centers of strategic cooperation with China.
The combined war of the United States and its efforts to weaken Iran’s domestic and regional power:
An analysis of the U.S. behavior towards countries that have a revisionist stance towards the liberal order demonstrates that Washington employs a combination of confrontation, competition, and interaction simultaneously to contain these actors. In its new strategy, the United States, in coordination with its allies in various regions of the world, seeks to engage countries like China, Russia, and Iran in geopolitical crises in the international arena while also subjecting them to social discontent and political instability internally. The objective of this strategy is to gradually erode the power of these countries and redirect their main focus toward internal and vicinity challenges. From the Western perspective, this approach would prevent active engagement by Iran and other rivals of the United States in shaping the new global order. However, since the possibility of comprehensive and simultaneous confrontation with these three countries is not feasible for the United States, it attempts tactically to use other methods, including interaction.
In the context of this strategy, interaction does not necessarily mean negotiation to offer concessions to the opposing party. Instead, diplomacy within this scenario serves as a tool for coalition-building against rival or adversarial actors. Furthermore, tactical diplomacy can have a deceptive function and, through altering the calculation system of elites, lead to passivity and neglect regarding the enemy’s main objectives. In other words, by sending conflicting signals to an actor, efforts are made to create strategic confusion for the opposing party, preventing a decisive reaction to the enemy. Currently, in the dual approach of the West towards the Islamic Republic of Iran, signs of this strategy can be observed.
Based on the available information, it can be said that the United States and some European countries are taking actions that still preserve the possibility of diplomacy with Iran. These countries refrain from completely closing the diplomatic window and have intensified sanctions, but they simultaneously utilize diplomatic channels to engage with Iran. However, the increase in pressures and sanctions can lead to discontent and instability within Iran. The assessment of the U.S. intelligence community is that due to economic woes, the possibility of riots in the near future through internal shock or external provocation is not far-fetched. Therefore, the U.S. government currently not only lacks the inclination to lift the sanctions but also hopes to create instability within Iran to intensify social and economic dissatisfaction.
In the context of the strategy of intelligent containment, it is predicted that the explicit and covert messages of the United States will continue regarding the resolution of certain conflicts, including issues such as the release of prisoners and the nuclear dossier. On the other hand, through certain actions such as targeted sanctions against complex networks involved in Iranian oil sales, increasing the costs for individuals and institutions actively contributing to psychological security in society by tarnishing their reputation, intensifying multidimensional pressures against revolutionary institutions, including the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and its subsidiaries, facilitating the access of disruptors to communication equipment and providing financial support to them, threatening military action, conducting joint exercises with regional countries, conducting tactical attacks against Iranian-affiliated forces at a regional level, supporting destructive attacks by the Zionist regime against Iranian military installations, serious investment in promoting Iranophobia, and efforts to increase convergence among rivals and enemies of Iran in the region through advancing the normalization of relations between the Zionist regime and Arab countries and utilizing the capacities of international institutions and organizations to exert higher levels of human rights pressure against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
To counter the strategy of the United States in the short term, the economic and trade plans of the country, especially in the areas of payment methods and logistics for essential goods, need to be changed. This is because the most significant tool used by the United States to intensify economic discontent and create domestic unrest is imposing restrictions on financial and logistical channels, leading to instability in exchange rates and increased food prices. Specifically, the current priority in countering US objectives is not seeking exemptions from the Treasury Department for the use of blocked funds in countries like Iraq and South Korea, but rather focusing on reviving currency governance through the creation of an official (yet confidential) payment network. This means gradually transitioning from a trust-centric payment network to a situation where a significant portion of oil and petrochemical revenues are deposited into the accounts of financial institutions affiliated with Chinese banks, under the supervision and control of the Central Bank. Additionally, at least half of the foreign currency expenditures related to the import of essential goods, pharmaceuticals, car parts, and mobile devices should be settled in yuan. In other words, by establishing an official payment network, the central bank will be able to control the foreign exchange market, balance yuan and dirham resources and expenditures, increase its bargaining power against the UAE and China, and to some extent, create a deterrent against foreign currency pressures. Furthermore, by establishing a yuan-based financial channel for settling imports of essential goods, a new logistics system outside the influence of US-affiliated networks will be created, significantly impacting Iran’s food security.
The ongoing efforts of the Zionist regime to continue the gray zone campaign in the region
An analysis of the behavior of the Zionist regime in recent years indicates that despite political instability and social unrest within the regime, as well as differences of opinion with the United States, its destructive actions against the Islamic Republic of Iran have continued, and in some cases, intensified. On one hand, the United States seeks to establish a kind of calm in the occupied territories and maintain the two-state solution, while on the other hand, it aims to contain and weaken the Islamic Republic of Iran at a minimal cost. The disagreements surrounding these two issues are not new in the relations between the United States and the Zionist regime. These tensions have existed since at least the Obama era. Even during the Trump era, despite withdrawing from the JCPOA, the United States was not willing to resort to military action against Iran’s nuclear program, in line with Netanyahu’s opinion. Part of this disagreement stems from the fact that the Zionist regime sees Iran as an existential threat, while from the perspective of the United States, the level of threat posed by Iran’s nuclear and missile programs is not existential.
The current debate between Netanyahu’s cabinet and the White House regarding the quality of interaction and confrontation with Iran specifically pertains to the dimensions of the alternative plan (Plan B) and its implementation. While the Biden administration has stated that negotiations regarding a return to the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) are not on the agenda of the United States after the latest round of talks in September 2022, the Zionist regime estimates that the lack of prioritizing negotiations is a temporary decision. Despite increased political and economic pressure, the White House officially expresses readiness to resort to more severe alternative options, including the military option against Iran.
On the other hand, Netanyahu seeks to prevent the revival of the nuclear agreement, anticipating the possibility of the United States returning to the JCPOA. Additionally, considering the proximity to a sensitive timeframe of UN Security Council Resolution 2231 regarding the lifting of sanctions against Iran’s missile program, Netanyahu aims to encourage Europe to activate the snapback mechanism before October of the current year. Due to the unsuccessful experience of the United States in activating the snapback mechanism in 2020, Netanyahu has focused primarily on utilizing the capacities of European countries to restore resolutions. Essentially, Tel Aviv, in addition to its efforts to strengthen the credibility and effectiveness of Plan B in curbing Iran’s nuclear program, highlights the missile threat posed by Iran. Consequently, there is a possibility that the Zionist regime, alongside psychological operations to portray Iran as being on the verge of producing nuclear warhead-capable missiles (as a significant part of their weapons production project), justifies major destructive operations within Iran to hinder missile advancements. In other words, Israel aims to reduce the international costs of its actions while drawing global attention to the Iranian missile threat.
In this regard, Netanyahu, in the first step, seeks to persuade France, Germany, and the UK to utilize the snapback mechanism against Iran by taking advantage of the recent tensions between Iran and Europe. Netanyahu’s main justification for his discussions with European governments is twofold. Firstly, he argues that Iran’s missile program, alongside its technological advancements in the field of enrichment, is a significant part of its nuclear weapons production project. Secondly, lifting the missile restrictions against Iran would essentially pave the way for the export of ballistic missiles to Russia, which would undermine the interests of European countries.
In the second step, by initiating lobbying efforts in the US Congress and leveraging influence over certain figures in the Biden administration, including Jake Sullivan, Netanyahu aims to increase the costs of Washington’s return to the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action). In this regard, Netanyahu justifies that returning to the JCPOA would mean disregarding the protests in Iran and assisting the state in overcoming internal challenges. In the third step, Netanyahu seeks to advance the process of normalization and establish a regional coalition against Iran by increasing convergence with countries in West Asia. Iran’s response to the regime’s strategy should be such that it creates the perception for the opposing parties that the actions of the Zionist regime not only fail to erode Iran’s power and contain it successfully but also lead to a more aggressive Iranian foreign policy and impose costs on the supporters of this regime.
A change in Iran’s approach, especially in the current period, is necessary. On the one hand, after the recent unrest in Iran, the perception has emerged that Tehran is in a position of weakness and faces greater limitations in responding to external threats than in the past. On the other hand, it must be demonstrated that domestic unrest has not influenced Iran’s determination for reciprocal action. Furthermore, given the proximity to the deadline of Resolution 2231 for lifting missile restrictions by the Security Council, Israel is promoting the proposition that Iran will not react seriously to the activation of the snapback mechanism, similar to the US withdrawal from the JCPOA in 2018. To prevent the establishment of this perception, Tehran must strive to convey this new approach to the opposing parties, that “Iran’s will, in response to destructive actions, interventionism, and external pressures, will actively shift towards increasing assertiveness in the realm of the Islamic Republic’s influence, which runs counter to Western interests.” The main challenge is for Tehran to behave in a manner that this change in approach is understood by the West in less than six months and before autumn. Otherwise, it will not have a deterrent effect.
The continuation of international campaigns to maintain a platform of turmoil and unrest in Iran
The use of human rights as a tool to pressure Iran has always existed, but after the recent unrest, its intensity and scope have significantly increased. At the governmental level, the focus and coordination among the United States, Canada, and European countries in exerting pressure on Iran have increased compared to similar events, and at the non-governmental level, the role played by the opposition outside the country in political lobbying and framing the narrative of what is happening inside Iran has been more prominent than ever before. The volume of anti-Iranian activities during the recent unrest exceeded the actions taken after the events of December 2017 and November 2019 in the international arena. The prolonged duration of the unrest and the emotional symbolism attached to it provided an opportunity for increased convergence between the United States and Europe. During the Trump era, the unrest ended within a short period, and the differences between the United States and Europe prevented the formation of a unified foreign front. During that period, although the United States implemented several sanctions against Iran and took a strong stance, on the one hand, Europeans did not fully align with the White House in imposing sanctions and political pressure, and on the other hand, the United States was not overly focused on this issue.
In the past three months, more than 200 individuals and legal entities in Iran have been sanctioned by the United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Canada. In addition to these actions, these countries lobbied and exerted pressure through human rights groups. The United Nations Security Council held an unofficial session to investigate the unrest in Iran, and a resolution on human rights against Iran was issued at the United Nations General Assembly.
Based on a resolution issued by the Human Rights Council, the “Fact-Finding Committee” was established. In the Third Committee of the General Assembly, with the adoption of the resolution, Iran was removed from the UN Commission on the Status of Women. Various statements against Iran were issued at the government level, both unilaterally and collectively, and social media platforms and Twitter were used to take positions and create a narrative against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
From a political perspective, highlighting the accusation of “widespread human rights violations” and tarnishing and undermining the image of a country serve two main purposes. On one hand, it provides a tool of pressure for foreign governments to bring the behavior of countries accused of human rights violations under control by changing their calculations. In this framework, efforts are made to isolate countries accused of human rights violations politically and increase the cost of their actions by creating international consensus. On the other hand, negative propaganda against a country significantly increases the cost of interaction and cooperation with that country. In other words, even foreign governments that play an active role in psychological operations against a country accused of human rights violations may face limitations in their subsequent interactions with that country due to the negative atmosphere they have contributed to creating, influenced by public opinion pressure and domestic political currents. A notable example of this can be seen in the Khashoggi murder case, where although highlighting the issue of Khashoggi’s murder provided an effective leverage for controlling the behavior and decisions of Mohammed bin Salman in the hands of the United States, in periods when Washington needed to control the oil market by Saudi Arabia, any kind of interaction with Saudi Arabia was considered as appeasement toward it and neglect of its human rights violations.
The substantial media campaign against Iran during the riots has increased the cost of any potential interaction with Tehran, especially regarding the nuclear issue, for the United States and Europe. As the image of Iran is tarnished in human rights issues, the risk of cooperation with Iran becomes even greater. Under such circumstances, Washington and Brussels will try to reduce this risk by significantly limiting their engagement with Iran, even if it is necessary to interact with Iran to achieve the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The international human rights campaign against Iran not only increases political pressure but also socially incites agitators to continue their riots and disruptive activities. In fact, accusing the Islamic Republic of Iran of “suppressing protests” and attempting to prevent the “execution of protesters” can be seen as spiritual support for agitators and a form of creating political immunity for their actions.
In addition to the influence of human rights campaigns in encouraging and enticing agitators, their most significant function lies in the social layer, legitimizing the destabilization project and interfering in Iran’s internal affairs under the pretext of supporting “peaceful protests” in the dichotomy of people and state. Under normal circumstances, interference in the internal affairs of other countries is relatively costly. However, in unusual circumstances, including within the context of protest movements, technical, economic, and political support for protesters is not seen as an intervention but rather as a mission and international responsibility to protect human rights and peaceful protests.
Considering that U.S. intelligence authorities, from the Director of National Intelligence to the head of the CIA, view dissatisfaction with the economic situation in Iran as a source for the emergence of new waves of turmoil and instability, they will seek to utilize the opportunities presented by the formation and continuation of these campaigns as a tool for intervening in Iran’s internal affairs.
Therefore, the most significant challenge at present is how to neutralize the heavy international onslaught against the Islamic Republic and normalize the situation. This issue requires special attention in the field of public diplomacy, which should be pursued by the executive bodies, especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and foreign missions of the Islamic Republic of Iran.
Summary:
In his 1402 Nowruz statements, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Revolution emphasized the need for transformation and addressing the weaknesses within the political and cultural structure of the Islamic Republic. He pointed out that the enemy seeks to weaken the strengths and highlight the weaknesses of the system and the public culture. According to the Leader, “national self-confidence” and “strong faith of the Iranian nation,” which are manifestations of the transformative culture of a nation, are important and fundamental elements for creating motivation for change in the governance structure and strengthening the will of the system’s officials. From the Leader’s perspective, “national self-confidence and strong faith” can overcome the weaknesses of the political system in the economic, foreign policy, and national identity spheres, involve the people in governance, and transform the governance from an elite-based system to a popular idea. This approach can neutralize threats, revive opportunities, and lead to the improvement of the state’s external strength. Therefore, by relying on the concept of transformation and addressing weaknesses, it is possible to overcome challenges and threats in the political, economic, cultural, and social spheres and utilize opportunities to strengthen the system. The 45-year experience of Iran after the Islamic Revolution demonstrates that wherever the role and presence of the people have been prominent and serious, national interests have been secured at the highest level with minimum costs, and wherever there has been negligence in this central concept of revolutionary leadership, it has provided an opportunity for the enemies to exploit. Therefore, it is crucial and important to have a precise understanding of the essence of transformation envisioned by the Supreme Leader and its practical implementation.